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ABSTRACT 
This paper considers the distribution of output and productive factors among members of 
a fully integrated economy (FIE) in which there is free mobility of goods and factors 
among members and whose members share the same technology. We first demonstrate 
that, within an FIE, each member’s share of total FIE output and its shares of total FIE 
stocks of productive factors will be equal. If economic policies are largely harmonized 
across FIE members then this “equal-share” property implies that the growth in any 
member’s shares of FIE output and factor stocks can be taken to be a random outcome. 
Building on Gabaix’s (1999) result for the distribution of city sizes we argue that, if 
output and factor shares among FIE members evolve as geometric Brownian motion with 
a lower bound, then the limiting distribution of these shares will exhibit Zipf’s law. We 
empirically examine for Zipf’s law for the distribution of output and factor shares across 
two (presumably) integrated economies: the 51 U.S. states and 14 European Union (E.U.) 
countries. Our empirical findings strongly support Zipf’s law with respect to the 
distribution of output, physical capital and human capital among U.S. states and among 
E.U. countries. These findings imply that models used to characterize the growth of 
members within an FIE should embody a key assumption: that the underlying growth 
process of shares is random and homogeneous across FIE members. 
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EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS OF ZIPF’S LAW FOR INTEGRATED 
ECONOMIES 
The number of regional trade agreements has increased continuously since the 
early 1990s and many new initiatives for special association agreements are currently 
being negotiated (see WTO website). Institutional arrangements under which countries 
open their borders differ in reality. Most agreements are designed to increase 
international trade between markets but a few, like the European Union, also allow 
greater mobility of productive factors within the integrated area. In the limit, such 
integration would be represented by a fully integrated economy (FIE) in which there is 
free mobility of goods and factors among FIE members together with complete 
harmonization of economic and social policies. 
While prior work has demonstrated the potentially important role of trade1 and 
factor mobility2 as influences on economic growth, less attention has been given to the 
question of how trade and factor mobility impact the distribution of output across 
members of a FIE, and hence how these influences affect the relative economic position 
of members. Apart from being simply a question of distributional consequences, analysis 
of this question has important implications for the nature of models that can be used to 
characterize the growth processes of FIE members. Specifically, as we will show in this 
paper, the distribution of output and factor shares across FIE members can be expected to 
conform to a rank-share distribution that exhibit Zipf’s law, which indicates a specific 
relationship between the rank and value of a variable. This result implies that models 
used to characterize the growth of members within an FIE must embody a key 
                                                          
1
 An extensive body of work has explored the role of international trade and of factor mobility as 
mechanisms generating endogenous economic growth. For example, Grossman and Helpman (1991) show 
that trade generally enhances growth, particularly when it facilitates the international transmission of 
knowledge. Similarly, Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) show that increased trade due to economic 
integration may have both level and growth effects depending upon the processes by which R&D and 
information flow across borders. Devereux and Lapham (1994) extend Rivera-Batiz and Romer’s model to 
show that, even without knowledge flows, the balanced growth rate when there is free trade in goods alone 
exceeds that in autarky, provided that initial levels of national income differ across countries. 
2
 For example, Baldwin and Martin (2004) examine the relationship between growth and the agglomeration 
of economic activity and find that it depends crucially on the extent of capital mobility between regions. 
Similarly, Viaene and Zilcha (2002) show that while complete capital market integration among countries 
has a positive effect on outputs, it does not raise long-run growth rates above autarky values. Instead, these 
growth rates are affected only by parameters that describe the accumulation of human capital. 
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assumption: that the underlying growth process of shares is random and homogeneous 
across members. 
Country shares of regional (or world) output, or shares of a region’s total supplies 
of productive factors, have become increasingly important constructs in the international 
trade literature (e.g., Bowen et al., 1987; Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Leamer, 1984; 
Viaene and Zilcha, 2002). In this regard, below we first demonstrate that, within an FIE, 
each member’s share of total FIE output will equal its shares of total FIE stocks of each 
productive factor (i.e., physical capital and human capital). If economic policies are 
largely harmonized across members then this equal-share property implies that the 
growth in any member’s shares of FIE output and factor stocks can be taken to be a 
random outcome. Following Gabaix (1999), if output and factor shares evolve as 
geometric Brownian motion with a lower bound, then the limiting distribution of these 
shares will exhibit Zipf’s law. Given this result, we then show that the limiting values of 
each FIE member’s output and factor shares are completely determined once the number 
of FIE members is specified.  
Given the theoretical expectation of Zipf’s law for output and factor shares, we 
empirically examine for this law within two (presumably) integrated economies: the 51 
U.S. states and 14 countries of the European Union (E.U.). The data generally cover the 
period from 1965 to 2000. Our empirical results convincingly support Zipf’s law for U.S. 
states and for E.U. countries. 
 
EQUALITY OF OUTPUT AND FACTOR SHARES IN INTEGRATED 
ECONOMIES 
To demonstrate the equality of output and factor shares for each member of a 
fully integrated economy we consider an integrated economy that consists of m = 1, …, 
M members, each producing a single good by means of a constant return to scale 
production function of the form: 
 
(1) ( , )mt mt mtY F K H=  m = 1, …, M 
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where Ymt is the level of output, Kmt the stock of physical capital, and Hmt the 
stock of human capital, all for country m at time t. The production function is assumed to 
satisfy all the neoclassical assumptions including diminishing marginal productivity with 
respect to each factor. For ease of exposition, the production function is assumed to take 
the Cobb Douglas form:3 
 
(2) 1m mmt mt mt mtY A K Hα α−=  m = 1, …, M  
 
where Amt is a scale parameter and mα  is capital’s share of total output. If physical 
capital and labor are perfectly mobile between the M economies then we would expect 
the marginal product of each factor to be equal. Barriers to capital mobility (e.g. 
corporate income tax differentials, capital controls) or labor mobility (e.g. language, 
different pension systems) would instead create persistent differences in factor rates of 
returns between members. Consider one reference member of this integrated economy 
that, without loss of generality, we take to be country i. Let kmtλ  and hmtλ  define the 
proportional difference in rates of return to physical capital and to human capital between 
any country m and reference country i. The relation between rates of return to physical 
capital in the integrated economy can then be written as: 
 
(3) 11 1
1
... ...
k kt it Mt
t M Mt
t it Mt
Y Y Y
v v
K K K
λ λ= = = =  
 
where νm = αm/αi, implying νm = 1 when αm = αi (m = 1, ..., M). Note that for m = 
i, 1kitλ =  and .1=iv  Likewise, the relation between rates of return to human capital can 
be written: 
 
(4) 11 1
1
... ...
h ht it Mt
t M Mt
t it Mt
Y Y Y
H H H
ω λ ω λ= = = =  
                                                          
3
 The Cobb-Douglas specification has wide empirical support (e.g., Mankiw et al., 1992). The analysis can 
be extended to the case where the production function has the constant elasticity of substitution (C.E.S.) 
form. 
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where (1 ) /(1 )m m iω α α= − − , implying =mω 1 when αm = αi (m = 1, ..., M).  Note 
that for m = i, 1=iω  and 1
h
itλ = . The ratio of (3) to (4) gives the following relationship 
between ratios of human to physical capital: 
(5) 1 11 1
1
1
... ...
M
m mt mt
t it Mt m
t M Mt M
t it Mt
mt
m
H
H H H
K K K K
η λ
η λ η λ =
=
= = = = =
∑
∑
 
where  
 
),1(/)1(/ miimmmm v ααααωη −−==  implying =mη 1 when im αα = ; 
/k hmt mt mtλ λ λ= , implying mtλ  =1 when k hmt mtλ λ= . 
 
Like in (5), we can rewrite (3) as: 
(6) 11 1
1
... ...
k kt it Mt
t M Mt
t it Mt
Y Y Y
v v
K K K
λ λ= = = = = 1
1
M
k
m mt mt
m
M
mt
m
v Y
K
λ
=
=
∑
∑
 
Combining (5) and (6) yields the following relationship between output and factor 
shares for reference member i of the integrated economy: 
 
(7) 
1 1 1
it it it
M M M
k
m mt mt mt m mt mt
m m m
Y K H
v Y K Hλ η λ
= = =
= =
∑ ∑ ∑
 i = 1, …, M 
 
We term equation (7) the “equal-share” relationship. This relationship determines 
the distribution of output and the distribution of factors across M members of an 
integrated economy. Expression (7) contains both observable variables ( , ,mt mt mtY K H ) and 
unknown parameters ( , , )k hm m mα λ λ . Differences in technology or factor market 
imperfections imply a multiplicative rescaling of the observable variables that is different 
for each ratio. For example, a difference in α’s leaves the observed values (and share) of 
physical capital unaffected but transforms the observed values of output and human 
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capital in different ways (through vm and mη  respectively). If we assume that the M 
members of the integrated economy share the same technology ( 1m m mη ν ω= = = ), and 
that there is costless (perfect) mobility of factors ( 1k hmt mtλ λ= = ), then we obtain the 
simplest expression of the equal-share relationship for any member i: 
 
(8) 
1 1 1
it it it
M M M
mt mt mt
m m m
Y K H
Y K H
= = =
= =
∑ ∑ ∑
  i = 1, …, M 
 
Hence, with perfect capital mobility and similar technology, each economy’s 
share of total FIE output, and each economy’s share of total FIE physical capital stock, 
equals its share of the total FIE stock of human capital.  
Relationship (8) has an important implication. It contrasts the policies pursued in 
isolation by any given FIE member with those that are instead pursued jointly 
(harmonized) across members. For example, (8) remains unchanged when a coordinated 
educational policy by all FIE members increases their human capital by the same 
proportion. In contrast, the same policy implemented by only one member increases that 
member’s share of total FIE human capital (as long as this policy is not imitated by other 
members). Hence, if FIE members have harmonized economic and social policies (e.g., 
fiscal, education, industrial policies) then the equal-share property implies that the 
relative performance of each member remains unaffected by these policies. In this sense, 
member shares can be considered to be a random variable whose outcome is dependent 
on the particular state of nature at time t. Such randomness can easily be understood from 
the fact that various kinds of random shocks, like discoveries, weather, or natural 
disasters, including some that are specific to a particular member, would give rise to new 
and different sets of shares for all members. 
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RANK-SHARE DISTRIBUTIONS AND ZIPF’S LAW 
A rank-share distribution describes a particular relationship between the share and 
rank of a variable across a set of observational units. It is related to the concept of a rank-
size distribution. For instance, a rank-size distribution for city size exists if the 
relationship between the natural logarithm of size and of rank is linear and exhibits a 
negative slope. Zipf’s law arises when the slope value equals -1.  
The existence of Zipf’s law for city sizes is a widely documented empirical 
regularity.4 Several explanations have been advanced for the observed regularity of Zipf’s 
law with respect to the distribution of city sizes. Some argue it constitutes an optimal 
spatial pattern that arises when congestion and urbanization externalities interact as part 
of the process of development and growth of cities. Such forces are usually found in core 
models of urban and regional growth5. Others have stressed more mechanical forces that 
often involve a random growth process for city size. A recent example is Gabaix (1999), 
who draws on Gibrat’s law6 to assume that cities follow a random but common growth 
process. Normalizing city population by a country’s total population, Gabaix shows (his 
Proposition 1) that if population shares evolve as geometric Brownian motion with an 
infinitesimal barrier then the steady state distribution of population shares will be a rank-
size distribution that exhibits Zipf’s law. 
As previously noted, the equal-share property for members of an FIE, together 
with an assumed harmonization of FIE member’s economic policies, implies that the 
relative performance of any one FIE member can be considered a random variable. Given 
this, we can adopt Gabaix’s (1999) specification and assume that the share of variable j 
(e.g., j = output) evolves as geometric Brownian motion with a lower bound7, and 
moreover, that the distribution of growth rates of these shares is common to all FIE 
                                                          
4
 See e.g. Brakman et al. (2001), Fujita et al. (1999), Gabaix and Ioannides (2004), Eeckhout (2004) and 
Rose (2005). 
5
 For example, see Eaton and Eckstein (1997), Black and Henderson (1999), Brakman et al. (1999). 
6
 Gibrat’s law (Gibrat, 1931) states that firm growth is independent of firm size.  
7
 One needs to prevent output and factors from falling below some lower bound in order to obtain a power 
law. Otherwise the distribution would be lognormal. A lower bound makes sense in integrated areas as 
important income transfers are institutionalized to prevent states/regions/countries to vanish. For example, 
the E.U. maintains a social fund and a regional fund.  
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members (i.e., Gibrat’s law).8 As in Gabaix (1999), this implies that the limiting 
distribution of the shares of variable j across FIE members will be a rank-share 
distribution that exhibits Zipf’s law.  
 
Empirical Specification 
 
Consider a FIE consisting of M members. Let Smj denote member m’s share of the 
total FIE amount of variable j ( j = output (y), physical capital (k) or human capital (h)) 
and let Rmj denote the rank of member m in the ranking of shares of variable j across all 
members (m = 1,…, M). We assume Rmj = 1 for the member with the largest share of 
variable j and Rmj = M for the member with the lowest share of variable j. If variable j has 
a rank-share distribution then we can write:  
(9) ( ) jmj j mjS R βγ=   
 
where βj < 0 is the power-law exponent and 0 < γj < 1 is the share of variable j for 
the member with the highest rank (i.e., Rmj = 1). Zipf’s law corresponds to βj = -1, and it 
implies a specific relationship among member shares, namely: S1j = 2S2j = 3S3j = … = 
MSMj. This states, for example, that the share value of the highest ranked country is twice 
the share value of the second ranked country.  
To empirically assess the hypothesis that output and factor shares conform to a 
rank-share distribution that exhibits Zipf’s law we can take the natural logarithm of each 
side of (9) to obtain: 
 
(10) ( ) ( )log logmj j j mj mjS R uθ β= + +  1,..., ; , ,m M j y k h= =  
 
where θj = log(γj) < 0 and umj is an error term assumed to have the usual properties 
(i.e., i.i.d. with mean zero and constant variance). Estimates of the intercept and of the 
slope parameter in (10) are crucial to our analysis and are obtained by regressing the 
share of variable j on variable j’s rank value across FIE members.  
                                                          
8
 The equal-share relationship implies that the common expected rate of growth is zero since the sum over i 
of the output and factor shares in (8) must be 1. 
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We estimate (10) separately for the output share, physical capital share and human 
capital share with respect to the 51 U.S. states and the 14 E.U. countries. For U.S. states, 
we use annual cross-section data covering the period from 1990 to 2000. For E.U. 
countries the data instead consist of cross-sections equally spaced at 5-year intervals; 
these data generally cover the period from 1965 to 2000. The Appendix gives a complete 
description of the data. 
Given estimates of (10) for a given dependent variable, evidence against Zipf’s 
law can be assessed by testing if the estimated slope coefficient is significantly different 
from minus one. However, Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) and Nishiyama and Osada 
(2004) recently demonstrate that both the OLS estimate of βj in (10) and its associated 
standard error are expected to be biased downward, with these biases diminishing as the 
number of observational units (M) increases. Hence, without some correction for these 
inherent biases, one is likely to more often reject Zipf’s law when it is in fact true.  
To correct for these biases, we follow Gabaix and Ioannides (2004, p. 10) and 
conduct, for the cases M = 14 (E.U. countries) and M = 51 (U.S. States), a Monte Carlo 
analysis of the OLS slope estimates derived from (10) under the assumption that Zipf’s 
law holds.9 The difference between the true slope value (-1) and the average of the OLS 
slope estimates gives an estimate of the downward bias, which is 0.172 for M = 14 and 
0.081 for M = 51. Given these estimates of the bias for each M, an estimate of the true 
slope coefficient is obtained by adding the estimated bias to the OLS estimate derived 
from (10).  
To obtain a bias adjusted estimate of the standard error we follow Nishiyama and 
Osada (2004) and use the asymptotic approximation to the true standard error of the OLS 
slope estimate given as ˆ 2j Mβ− , where ˆ jβ  is the OLS estimate of the slope in (10).10  
                                                          
9
 Briefly, for a given sample size M (either M = 14 or M = 51), 100,000 Monte Carlo simulations were 
performed drawing from an exact power law with coefficient 1 (Zipf’s Law). This involved drawing M 
i.i.d. variables vm, uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1], and then constructing sizes Lm = 1/vm. The Lm 
were then normalized into shares Sm that were then ordered and assigned a rank value Rm. We then 
preformed 100,000 OLS regressions using the specification log(Sm) = θ + β log(Rm) + ui.  The complete 
results are available from the authors upon request. 
10
 Another method for estimating the parameters of a power law distribution is the maximum likelihood 
Hill estimator (Hill, 1975). However, as Gabaix and Ioannides (2004) remark, the properties of the Hill 
estimator in finite samples can be "very worrisome," and in particular their theoretical results predict a large 
bias in parameter estimates and associated standard errors in small samples. We computed the Hill 
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The test statistic formed using these bias corrected values has asymptotically a normal 
distribution (Nishiyama and Osada, 2004). 
 
Results 
 
The first two columns of Table 1 report OLS estimates of (10) for the share of 
output, physical capital and human capital for the sample of U.S. states; the first two 
columns of Table 2 report the OLS estimates for the sample of E.U. countries.11 Over 
both set of results, the adjusted R-squares fall in the range from 0.791 to 0.945, indicating 
a strong relationship between the share and rank of each variable.  
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
In Table 1, the column labeled “Z-statistic Testing Slope = -1” indicates strong 
support for the hypotheses that the output and factor shares for U.S. states conform to a 
rank-share distribution that exhibits Zipf’s law; in no case can we reject (at the 5% level) 
the hypothesis that the slope coefficient is significantly different from –1. This is strong 
evidence that, for U.S. States, each of the three share distributions exhibit Zipf’s law.  
Likewise, the column labeled “Z-statistic Testing Slope = -1” in Table 2 indicates 
also strong support for the hypotheses that the output and factor shares for E.U. countries 
conform to a rank-share distribution that exhibits Zipf’s law: we cannot reject (at 5% 
level) the hypothesis that the slope coefficient is significantly different from -1. These 
findings for U.S. states and for E.U. countries are striking empirical results.12 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
estimators (results not shown) and indeed found very high downward biases in both parameter estimates 
and standard errors.  
11
 The standard errors associated with the OLS estimates are “robust” in the sense of White (1980). 
12
 By comparison, we preformed similar tests for 30 developing countries and a “world” of 55 countries but 
no evidence of Zipf’s law was found at the usual significance levels. 
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FURTHER CHARACTERIZATION OF INTEGRATED ECONOMIES  
The empirical findings of the preceding section have further implications 
regarding the characterization of integrated economies. One implication is the potential 
empirical validity of the equal-share relationship as derived in (8) since, if Zipf’s Law 
holds, the output shares across countries, or shares of any given factor, are proportional. 
Hence, if the equal-share relationship holds for one country then it must then also hold 
for all other countries. A second implication is that if Zipf’s Law holds then the limiting 
share values across FIE members are completely determined once the number of FIE 
members is specified.  
 
Equal-share Relationship 
 
A test for the equal-share relationship involves the null hypothesis given by 
equation (8) against the alternative hypothesis given by (7). Evidence in favor of the 
equal-share relationship can be obtained in two steps: (1) test for homogeneity of the 
OLS slope estimates (i.e., whether βy = βk = βh) to verify that the distributions of shares 
come from a common power-law distribution and (2) test for homogeneity of the 
intercepts across the three share equations (i.e., whether θy = θk = θh) to examine if the 
equal-share relationship holds with respect to the highest ranked member of each FIE 
(i.e., California for U.S. states and Germany for E.U. countries).13 Failure to reject the 
null hypothesis would imply that technological differences and factor market 
imperfections are not strong enough to prevent the equal-share relationship from holding 
in a statistical sense. 
Table 3 reports p-values for testing the hypotheses of slope homogeneity and of 
intercept homogeneity across the three share distributions in each sample year.14  For 
U.S. states, in neither of the two years for which data are available on all three shares 
(1990 and 2000) can we reject the hypotheses of intercept equality and slope equality, 
supporting the equal-share relationship for U.S. states. The results for E.U. countries also 
                                                          
13Equally, it can be demonstrated that the equal-share property obtains if one assumes 1) that output shares 
alone exhibit Zipf’s law and 2) that FIE members have identical, homogenous of degree one, production 
functions. 
14
 These tests were performed by establishing, in each year, a system comprising the three share equations 
but without initially imposing any cross-equation parameter restrictions. 
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indicate support for the equal-share relationship. These test results are based on slope 
estimates uncorrected for bias. However, correcting for the expected downward bias 
would only strengthen the support for the equal-share relationship evidenced here.  
Insert Table 3 About Here 
Limiting Distribution of Shares  
 
Let Vmj denote the level of variable j for member m. Assume, without loss of 
generality, that member 1 has the highest value of variable j and let δmj be member m’s 
value of variable j relative to that of member 1 (i.e., δmj = Vmj / V1j), so that δ1j = 1.  Now 
order the values of variable j in descending order. This ordering of the values of variable j 
across the m = 1, …, M members can be written:  
 
(11) V1j >  δ2j V1j >  δ3j V1j > ... >  δMj V1j  
. 
Since the total FIE amount of variable j is (1 + δ1j + δ2j + …+ δMj)V1j, (11) implies 
the following relations between member ranks and shares: 
 
(12) 
1
2 3
2
2
2 3
3
3
2 3
2 3
1
 1:   ;
1 ...
 2 :   ;
1 ...
 3 :   ;
1 ...
 M : .
1 ...
j
j j Mj
j
j
j j Mj
j
j
j j Mj
Mj
Mj
j j Mj
Rank S
Rank S
Rank S
Rank S
δ δ δ
δ
δ δ δ
δ
δ δ δ
δ
δ δ δ
=
+ + + +
=
+ + + +
=
+ + + +
=
+ + + +
M M
 
Expressions (12) indicate that sequence of shares Smj is a Harmonic series, where 
each share value Smj depends on the values of the δ’s and the number of members M. 
Accepting our preceding empirical evidence that the distribution of shares exhibits Zipf’s 
law then δ2j = 1/2, δ3j = 1/3, δ4j = 1/4, etc., so that the theoretical shares in (12) can be 
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computed once the number of members (M) is specified. For example, the theoretical 
share values for the M = 51 U.S. states are: 0.2213, 0.1106, 0.0738, 0.0553, …, 0.0043.  
For the M = 14 E.U. countries the theoretical share values are: 0.3075, 0.1538, 0.1025, 
0.0769, …, 0.0220. 
We conduct correlation and graphical analyses to gain insight on whether the 
observed distribution of shares conforms to the theoretically expected distribution of 
shares computed using (12). The relationship between actual shares and those computed 
from (12) is investigated in Table 4 which reports simple correlation coefficients between 
the natural logarithms of these shares for U.S. states and E.U countries in 1990 and 2000. 
The correlations range from 0.9176 to 0.9619 and all are highly significant, indicating a 
strong positive relationship between actual and theoretical shares. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Figure 1 provides a graphical presentation of the share distributions by plotting 
the logarithm of the theoretically expected shares assuming Zipf’s law holds and the 
logarithm of the actual shares in 2000 for each integrated economy. By definition, the 
theoretical shares (in logs) lie on a straight line with slope -1. Examination of the figures 
indicates that similar patterns between actual and theoretical shares appear for all three 
variables, whether for U.S. states or for E.U. countries. For example, for U.S. states, the 
graphs indicate that the share for the first observation (rank 1) is below the theoretical 
first share while in the middle range of the distribution the actual share is above the 
theoretical share. For E.U. countries the actual first share is instead very close to the 
theoretical share.  
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
There are several explanations for the observed deviation in actual share values 
from their theoretical values. One is that the theoretical share distribution is a steady state 
prediction and our sample values may not represent this ideal. Another is that our 
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theoretical model assumes that each FIE is “closed,” in that goods and factor flows arise 
only between FIE members. In reality, both U.S. states and E.U. countries have important 
trade and factor flow linkages with entities outside these defined integrated economies. A 
third is that, since the shares for a given variable sum to unity across observations, the 
sum of their differences at each rank (i.e., the “residual”) must be zero. Hence, the sum of 
any positive “residuals” must be offset by the sum of negative “residuals.” To an 
approximation, this same result will hold for the sum of the difference between the shares 
at each rank when measured in logarithms. 
 
DISCUSSION 
We examined empirically for evidence that the distribution of output and factor 
shares exhibit Zipf’s law with respect to two integrated economies: the 51 U.S. states and 
14 E.U. countries. The findings indicate that Zipf’s law indeed holds for the distribution 
of these shares among U.S. states and also among E.U. countries. While there may be 
several explanations for this empirical finding, the evidence on the empirical significance 
of Zipf’s law is consistent with a model that assumes that the growth process of the 
shares of members of an integrated economy is random and homogeneous across 
members. 
Our empirical results also supported the existence of the equal-share relationship 
for both U.S. states and E.U. countries. This evidence leads to several implications 
regarding the characterization of integrated economies. First, the equal-share relationship 
addresses Lucas’ (1990) question as to why capital does not flow from rich to poor 
countries. Namely, an economy with a low level (and hence a low share) of human 
capital will also have a low share of physical capital, and also a low share of output. 
Second, if the equal-share relationship holds, then all members of an integrated economy 
will have the same output per efficiency unit of labor. This implication is the essence of 
the absolute convergence hypothesis (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, p.47), here 
interpreted in terms of efficiency units of labor, not in per capita terms. Finally, the 
empirical significance of the equal-share relationship is consistent with the relative 
growth performance of members of an integrated economy being largely random, and 
hence strongly dependent on particular states of nature. Such randomness will be more 
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true the greater the extent of economic integration among members, perhaps most 
exemplified by the integrated economy comprising U.S. states. Hence, it is more likely to 
be true the more harmonized are education systems and fiscal codes, when members do 
not run independent monetary policies, and when industrial policies are quickly imitated 
across members. 
We also derived the result that, when Zipf’s law holds, the values of the output 
and factor shares for members of a fully integrated economy are completely determined 
once the number of members is specified. These shares are limiting values that derive 
from the relative position (rank) of each member and would be expected to emerge as 
integrated economies approach full integration. Nonetheless, a comparison of actual share 
values to these theoretically expected share values indicated a high degree of agreement.  
In providing evidence for Zipf’s law and the equal-share relationship with respect 
to members of an integrated economy, this paper indicates that these empirical 
characterizations should be kept in mind when studying the implications of alternative 
policies on the relative growth of members of an integrated economic area.  
 18 
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APPENDIX – DATA METHODS AND SOURCES 
The output for each of the 51 U.S. states is measured by real gross state product as 
reported by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).15 These data are available 
yearly from 1990 to 2000.  
Estimates of state physical capital stocks are derived from BEA (2002) estimates 
of the total U.S. physical capital stock in each of nine one-digit industrial sectors 
comprising all economic activity.16  These national physical capital stocks in each 
industry are allocated to each state by multiplying an industry’s total capital stock17 by 
that industry’s contribution to a state’s total income.18 These industry capital stock 
estimates are then summed, for each state, to obtain an estimate of a state’s total stock of 
physical capital.19 The calculation performed for each state at each time t can be 
expressed algebraically as  
( )9
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )m j mj m
j
k t K t y t Y t
=
 =  ∑  
In this equation, km(t) is the stock of physical capital in state m, ymj(t) is value 
added by industry j in state m (m = 1…51), Ym(t) is state m’s total value added, and Kj(t) 
is the national level stock of physical capital in industry j (j = 1,…, 9). This procedure 
assumes that the capital-to-output ratio within an industry j (i.e., kmj(t)/ymj(t)) is the same 
across U.S. states, that is, kmj(t)/ymj(t) = Km(t)/Ym(t). In turn, this assumption implies that 
an industry is in a common steady state across all U.S. states.20 For example, the 
agricultural sector in Texas is in the same steady state as its counterpart in Oregon, and 
                                                          
15
 Data on gross state product available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/gsp 
16
 The sectors (BEA code) are Farming (81), Agricultural services, forestry, fishing & other (100); Mining 
(200); Construction (300); Manufacturing (400); Transportation(500); Wholesale and retail trade (610); 
Finance, insurance and real estate (700); and Services (800). 
17
 Data on state physical capital stocks by industry were taken from U.S. Fixed Assets Tables, available at 
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/faweb 
18
 Annual data on state value added available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/spi 
19
 This procedure follows that used by Munnel (1990) and Garofalo and Yamarik (2002). 
20
 If a sector is converging towards its steady state, the output-to-capital ratio would be below its steady-
state value. This only poses a problem if the initial output-to-capital ratios vary across U.S. states. If the 
ratios do vary, the procedure would allocate too much to those states further from steady-state and too little 
to those states closer to their steady state.  
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the manufacturing sector in Pennsylvania is in the same steady state as its counterpart in 
Ohio.21 The constructed physical capital data are from 1990 to 2000, on a yearly basis. 
Human capital stocks for U.S. states are proxied by the number of persons with at 
least secondary level education. They are derived from data on state educational 
attainment taken from the U.S. Bureau of the Census.22 Census data on educational 
attainment are available only every 10 years, which limited the construction of human 
capital stocks to two years: 1990, and 2000. 
For E.U. countries, each country’s total output is measured by its real gross 
domestic product (GDP) derived from the data on real GDP per capita (base year = 1996) 
and population in Penn World Tables 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002). The output 
data are available annually from 1960 to 2000. 
Data on E.U. physical capital stocks are derived from Penn World Tables 5.6 
(Heston and Summers, 1991a and 1991b) which reports four data series for each country: 
(1) population, (2) physical capital stock per worker, (3) real GDP per capita and (4) real 
GDP per worker. The physical capital stocks for each country are constructed as the 
product of the first three series divided by the last series. The data covers the period 
1965-1990. Physical capital stock data for E.U. countries are also available from Timmer 
et al. (2003) covering period 1980-2000.23 These data sources are combined to have 
physical capital stock data in each of seven years from 1965 to 2000.24 
Each E.U. country’s stock of human capital stock is measured by multiplying the 
percentage of a country’s population having at least a secondary level of education with 
the country’s total population. Data on the rate of educational attainment for each country 
are taken from Barro and Lee (1993, 1996, and 2000).25 Data on a country’s population 
are from Heston, Summers and Aten (2002). Since data on rates of educational attainment 
                                                          
21
 If a sector has a different steady state, and hence a different capital-to-output ratio, the procedure will 
allocate too much to states with lower ratios and too little to states with higher ratios. However, this 
possibility is unlikely if competition lead firms in all states to adopt the best available production 
technology. 
22
 Decennial Census dataset available at http://factfinder.census.gov 
23
 Physical capital database available at http://www.ggdc.net/dseries/growth-accounting.shtml 
24
 Estimation was conducted using both sets of data for E.U. countries. No qualitative difference in results 
was found for the years in which data were available from both sources (i.e., 1980, 1985 and 1990). For 
these three years we therefore report only the results using the capital stock data from Timmer et al. (2003). 
25
 Other studies using the Barro-Lee data include Rajan and Zingales (1998), Ramey and Ramey (1995), 
Barro (1999), Easterly and Levine (1998), Hall and Jones (1999) and Sachs and Warner (1995). 
 24 
are only available every 5 years, the data sample is limited to five-year intervals from 
1960 to 2000. Following this constraint, the output and physical capital stocks are also 
obtained in five-year intervals. 
The 14 E.U. countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United 
Kingdom.26  
                                                          
26
 Luxembourg is excluded for lack of data on human capital. Given the small scale of Luxembourg’s 
economy relative to other E.U. countries this omission is unlikely to affect the E.U. results. 
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TABLE 1 
OLS Estimates of Rank-Share Relationships for U.S. States 
 
Variable Year Intercept a Slope b Z-statistic Testing Slope = -1 c Adj. R
2
 
1990 -1.179 (0.248)  -1.101 (0.081) -0.092 0.887 
1991 -1.194 (0.248)  -1.093 (0.081) -0.055 0.884 
1992 -1.199 (0.252)  -1.090 (0.082) -0.042 0.883 
1993 -1.207 (0.258)  -1.085 (0.084) -0.019 0.881 
1994 -1.208 (0.265)  -1.084 (0.086) -0.014 0.876 
1995 -1.209 (0.265)  -1.083 (0.086) -0.009 0.874 
1996 -1.205 (0.267)  -1.085 (0.087) -0.019 0.872 
1997 -1.192 (0.271)  -1.091 (0.088) -0.046 0.868 
1998 -1.173 (0.272)  -1.100 (0.088) -0.087 0.868 
1999 -1.168 (0.271)  -1.103 (0.088) -0.101 0.866 
Output Share 
(M = 51) 
2000 -1.164 (0.266)  -1.106 (0.087) -0.114 0.868 
1990 -1.199 (0.246)  -1.092 (0.080) -0.051 0.892 
1991 -1.207 (0.247) -1.089 (0.080) -0.037 0.891 
1992 -1.200 (0.251) -1.092 (0.081) -0.051 0.892 
1993 -1.197 (0.257) -1.093 (0.083) -0.055 0.890 
1994 -1.196 (0.266) -1.092 (0.086) -0.051 0.884 
1995 -1.173 (0.275) -1.102 (0.089) -0.096 0.879 
1996 -1.168 (0.276) -1.105 (0.089) -0.110 0.878 
1997 -1.126 (0.286) -1.125 (0.093) -0.198 0.870 
1998 -1.126 (0.283) -1.126 (0.091) -0.202 0.876 
1999 -1.108 (0.283) -1.135 (0.092) -0.240 0.875 
Physical Capital 
Share  
(M = 51) 
2000 -1.093 (0.282) -1.143 (0.091) -0.274 0.880 
1990 -1.244 (0.280) -1.064 (0.091) 0.081 0.854 Human Capital Share 
(M = 51) 2000 -1.264 (0.293) -1.054 (0.096) 0.129 0.839 
a
 OLS standard errors in parentheses. All intercept coefficients significantly different from zero at 1% level. 
b
 OLS standard errors in parentheses. All slope coefficients significantly different from zero at 1% level.  
c
 Computed as the OLS slope estimate minus (- 1) plus 0.081 (the bias) divided by the asymptotic 
approximation of the true standard error (given as minus the OLS slope estimate times 0.198 = (2/51)0.5. All 
slope coefficients are not significantly different from –1 at the 5% level. 
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TABLE 2: OLS Estimates of Rank-Share Relationships for E.U. Countries  
Variable Year Intercept a Slope b Z-statistic Testing Slope = -1 c Adj. R
2
 
1960 -0.645 (0.397) -1.461 (0.192) -0.523 0.908 
1965 -0.665 (0.416) -1.435 (0.204) -0.485 0.889 
1970 -0.699 (0.433) -1.406 (0.212) -0.440 0.867 
1975 -0.742 (0.435) -1.366 (0.211) -0.376 0.859 
1980 -0.755 (0.419) -1.357 (0.202) -0.361 0.870 
1985 -0.763 (0.417) -1.354 (0.199) -0.356 0.872 
1990 -0.772 (0.420) -1.346 (0.198) -0.342 0.872 
1995 -0.777 (0.405) -1.343 (0.187) -0.337 0.878 
Output Share 
(M = 14) 
2000 -0.857 (0.376)* -1.272 (0.170) -0.208 0.885 
1965 -0.816 (0.417) -1.293 (0.217) -0.248 0.851 
1970 -0.825 (0.396) -1.275 (0.208) -0.214 0.858 
1975 -0.836 (0.388)* -1.262 (0.203) -0.189 0.858 
1980 -0.760 (0.484) -1.332 (0.245) -0.318 0.828 
1985 -0.732 (0.404) * -1.358 (0.205) -0.362 0.870 
1990 -0.670 (0.398) -1.418 (0.206) -0.459 0.873 
1995 -0.632 (0.330) -1.457 (0.174) -0.518 0.908 
Physical 
Capital Share 
(M = 14) 
2000 -0.658 (0.382) -1.431 (0.186) -0.479 0.904 
1960 -0.147 (0.448) -2.103 (0.287) -1.171 0.791 
1965 -0.343 (0.341) -1.890 (0.184) -1.005 0.880 
1970 -0.529 (0.280) * -1.639 (0.176) -0.754 0.865 
1975 -0.642 (0.236) ** -1.518 (0.126) -0.603 0.928 
1980 -0.683 (0.239) ** -1.433 (0.122) -0.482 0.933 
1985 -0.747 (0.185) ** -1.409 (0.092) -0.445 0.945 
1990 -0.895 (0.191) ** -1.241 (0.112) -0.147 0.912 
1995 -0.897 (0.201) ** -1.225 (0.115) -0.114 0.912 
Human 
Capital Share 
(M = 14) 
2000 -0.905 (0.196) ** -1.215 (0.110) -0.094 0.919 
 
a
 OLS standard errors in parentheses. Significantly different from zero at ** = p < 0.05 or * = p < 0.10  
b
 OLS standard errors in parentheses. All slope coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1% 
level.  
c
 Computed as the OLS slope estimate minus (-1) plus 0.172 (the bias) divided by the asymptotic 
approximation of the true standard error (given as minus the OLS slope estimate times 0.3779 = (2/14)0.5. 
All slope coefficients are not significantly different from –1 at the 5% level. 
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TABLE 3 
Results Testing the Equal-Share Relationship 
 
 
p-values for testing across-equation  
homogeneity of 
Integrated Economy Year 
intercepts slopes 
1990 0.9680 0.9014 
U.S. States 
2000 0.8241 0.5964 
1965 0.6063 0.0445 a 
1970 0.8011 0.2797 
1975 0.8619 0.3655 
1980 0.9689 0.8461 
1985 0.9969 0.9305 
1990 0.8111 0.6034 
1995 0.7124 0.3697 
European Union 
2000 0.7291 0.4072 
 
a
 Cross-equation homogeneity rejected at 5% level.   
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TABLE 4 
 
Correlations between Logarithm of Actual and Theoretical Output and Factor 
Shares for U.S. States and E.U. Countries, 1990 and 2000 
 
 
Correlation Between Logarithm of Actual Shares and Theoretical 
Shares of  Integrated 
Economy Year 
Output Physical Capital Human Capital 
1990 0.9429 0.9456 0.9258 
U.S. States 
2000 0.9332 0.9393 0.9176 
1990 0.9392 0.9397 0.9397 European 
Union 2000 0.9453 0.9548 0.9619 
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FIGURE 1: Theoretical and Actual Share Distributions for U.S. States and E.U. 
Countries 
 
U.S. States E.U. Countries 
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